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In 2001, Friedman et al. conjectured the existence of a “firewall effect” in which individuals who are infected with HIV, but remain
in a state of low infectiousness, serve to prevent the virus from spreading. To evaluate this historical conjecture, we develop a new
graph-theoreticmeasure that quantifies the extent towhich Friedman’s firewall hypothesis (FH) holds in a risk network.We compute
this new measure across simulated trajectories of a stochastic discrete dynamical system that models a social network of 25,000
individuals engaging in risk acts over a period of 15 years. The model’s parameters are based on analyses of data collected in prior
studies of the real-world risk networks of people who inject drugs (PWID) in New York City. Analysis of system trajectories reveals
the structural mechanisms by which individuals with mature HIV infections tend to partition the network into homogeneous
clusters (with respect to infection status) and how uninfected clusters remain relatively stable (with respect to infection status) over
long stretches of time. We confirm the spontaneous emergence of network firewalls in the system and reveal their structural role
in the nonspreading of HIV.
1. Introduction
Social network research among people who inject drugs
(PWID) has produced considerable data on HIV-1 infection
profiles and equally detailed data on the broad demographic
and behavioral profiles of injecting communities and their
risk behaviors. However, prior research has not—and for rea-
sons of cost often cannot—produce long-term, dynamic data
on these same populations. Risk networks—graphs whose
vertices are individuals and edges are social connections bear-
ing disease transmission risk—are now widely recognized
as a critical construct in understanding infection patterns
[1, 2], as they represent the natural environment in which
risk behaviors take place and through which infection prop-
agates. Such a representation shifts our view of risk away
from individual behaviors to collective, social bodies as the
carriers and transmitters of infections [3, 4]. Modeling risk
networks as (stochastic) discrete dynamical systems provides
an opportunity to understand (through both analysis and
simulation) the long-term behavior of PWID risk networks
themselves—well beyond what can be seen by considering
their constituent individuals in isolation.
HIV has been investigated extensively in a number of
PWID communities, including New York City [5], where
there was a rapid initial spread of the virus among PWID in
the early 1980s, but where HIV prevalence stabilized to
between 40 and 50% (i.e., at much lower than 100% or “satu-
ration” levels), despite the fact that risk behaviors could result
in infection remained common [6]. One interesting aspect
of HIV’s natural history is the fact that its viral burden has
a tendency to transition from an acute, highly infectious
phase to a chronic phase where overall infectiousness ismuch
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lower. Real-world PWID risk networks exhibit interesting
characteristics as well, including a high degree of clustering
[7]. The challenge taken up by us in the present work is to
make evident how subsaturation stabilization comes about
within the proposed stochastic discrete dynamical system,
through the complex interplay of the natural history of HIV
and PWID risk network dynamics.
Outline. In Section 2, we develop a stochastic discrete dynam-
ical system that models HIV propagation in a PWID risk
network, setting its parameters based on data gathered in
an earlier study on Social Factors for HIV Risk in New
York City [6]. In Section 3, we design a (macrolevel) graph-
theoretic formalization of Friedman et al.’s firewall hypothesis
(FH). In Section 4, we determine the extent to which FH
is manifested in the stochastic discrete dynamical system,
by sampling its trajectories via simulation. Finding the
hypothesis tenable, in Section 5 we proceed to dissect the sys-
tem trajectories to reveal the structural mechanisms behind
the emergence of the FH phenomenon and its role in the
continued regulation of HIV propagation within PWID risk
networks.
2. Mathematical Model
The mathematical model underlying the stochastic discrete
dynamical system consists of three parts: (i) the network
model describes what real-world PWID risk networks “look
like” and how to create artificial ones which may serve as
plausible and interesting initial states of the system; this is the
subject of Section 2.1; (ii) the dynamism model describes the
evolution of system trajectories by specifying how PWID risk
networks restructure themselves over time in response to the
departure and arrival of individuals; this is the subject of
Section 2.2; (iii) the infectionmodel describes the evolution of
system trajectories by formalizing the process by which HIV
spreads as a consequence of individual risk acts; this is the
subject of Section 2.3.
2.1. NetworkModel. Within a PWID risk network, each node
is an individual and each edge represents a relationship that
bears the potential for injection drug couse—referred to
hereafter as risk relationship.The networkmodel specifies the
process by which we construct plausible PWID risk networks
that may serve as initial states (i.e., from which trajectories
of the stochastic discrete dynamical system may be fruitfully
generated). The network model consists of four parts: (A)
obtain data on real-world PWID risk networks, (B) define
a statistical network model, (C) specify model parameters
based on real-world PWID risk network data, and finally,
(D) generate new artificial PWID risk networks using the
parametrized model. In what follows, we describe each of
these four parts in greater detail.
In what follows, we adhere to the standard mathematical
conventions: given a set 𝑆, we denote its cardinality by |𝑆|.
Given two sets 𝑆, 𝑇, we denote by 𝑆 × 𝑇 the set of all ordered
pairs (𝑠, 𝑡), where 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 and 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇. A function 𝑓 with domain
𝐷 and range 𝑅 is so declared by the assertion 𝑓 : 𝐷 → 𝑅.
Given a subset 𝑌 ⊆ 𝑅, the set 𝑓−1(𝑌) is defined to be the set
of elements 𝑥 ∈ 𝐷 for which 𝑓(𝑥) ∈ 𝑌.
(A) Obtaining Data on Real-World Risk Networks. We view
a risk network as a combinatorial fabric, weaving together
a set of 𝑛 individuals, each of whom has 𝑚 properties, and
where each individual may host an instance of the pathogen.
A human population 𝑉 may be surveyed in order to map
out its instantaneous state: each constituent individual V
being interrogated about a fixed set of 𝑚 attributes 𝑋 =
{𝑥
1
, . . . , 𝑥
𝑚
}; for example, 𝑥
1
could be gender, while 𝑥
2
might
be age, and so on We assume that each variable 𝑥
𝑖
(for 𝑖 =
1, . . . , 𝑚) is categorical, taking values from a finite set 𝑈
𝑖
that
is known in advance (e.g., 𝑈
1
could be {Male, Female}, while
𝑈
2
might be {21AndUnder, Over21}). Each node attribute 𝑥
𝑖
(𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑚) is viewed as a function 𝑥
𝑖
: 𝑉 → 𝑈
𝑖
. To model
a risk network, the survey process must go beyond individual
attributes and collect data on the risk relationships between
individuals. In practice, during the survey, each individual V
from 𝑉 is asked to provide sufficient information required to
identify the individuals 𝑁(V) ⊆ 𝑉 with whom V has a risk
relationship. In other words, the survey must capture indi-
vidual ego network data that can then be aggregated to define
the risk network as a whole. By collecting data on𝑁(V) in the
survey, we are able to specify 𝑑 : 𝑉 → N, where 𝑑(V) =
|𝑁(V)| is the number of risk relationships V has. The set of all
risk relationships is then expressible as 𝐸 = ⋃V∈𝑉𝑁(V).
Finally, the survey must collect data on disease prevalence
by identifying the set of individuals 𝐴 ⊆ 𝑉 who are afflicted
by the particular pathogen of interest. Collecting the above
elements, we define a risk network to be the (𝑚 + 4) tuple
D = (𝑥
𝑖
, 𝑉, 𝐸, 𝐴, 𝑑), where 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑚.
In the context of this work, we drew upon data collected
in the Social Factors and HIV Risk study (SFHR). Conducted
between 1990 and 1993, SFHR was a cross-sectional, mixed
methods project that asked 767 out-of-treatment intravenous
drug users about their risk networks and HIV risk behaviors
in the prior 30 days. Interested in both individuals’ network
composition (namely, the presence of high-risk partners)
and sociometric risk position, the SFHR study produced
several major findings relevant to risk populations with high
HIV prevalence and low secondary incidence [8–15]. SFHR
documented 662 connections between study participants
(which after symmetrizing and eliminating duplicates yielded
a set of 1032 edges).These edges partitioned the study subjects
into 92 connected components, including a large connected
component of 230 individuals containing a 105-member 2-
core exhibiting higher HIV prevalence [2].
(B) Defining a Statistical Network Model. In modeling a
risk network D, the question arises as to the “appropri-
ate” contents of the model, particularly, which 𝑚 attributes
𝑋 = {𝑥
1
, . . . , 𝑥
𝑚
} are significantly influential in the for-
mation of risk relationships? To this end, the statistical
analysis of network data has been advanced considerably by
the introduction of Exponential Random Graph Modeling
(ERGM), a statistical technique aimed at determining the
extent to which the likelihood of network linkages appears
to be biased towards (or against) the creation of specified
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network substructures (above and beyond what is expected
by chance). Such substructures can be as simple as the
tendency of “like” nodes to be connected (at a greater rate
than expected by a randomdistribution of connections), or as
complex as specific structures of connection between sets of
individuals [16]. The theoretical basis for ERGM analysis has
been known for some time [17, 18], with estimation questions
settled recently [19]; several detailed expositions of ERGMare
available [20–22].
Given a risk network D = (𝑥
𝑖
, 𝑉, 𝐸, 𝐴, 𝑑), where (𝑖 =
1, . . . , 𝑚), we can from each of the attributes 𝑥
𝑖
determining
a univariate attribute distribution 𝛼
𝑖
: 𝑈
𝑖
→ [0, 1], defined
such that for 𝑢 ∈ 𝑈
𝑖
𝛼
𝑖
(𝑢)
def
=
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨
𝑥
−1
𝑖
(𝑢)
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨
|𝑉|
. (1)
The relationships 𝐸 define 𝑚 bivariate attribute distributions
𝛽
𝑖
: 𝑈
𝑖
× 𝑈
𝑖
→ [0, 1], wherein for each for 𝑢
1
, 𝑢
2
∈ 𝑈
𝑖
𝛽
𝑖
(𝑢
1
, 𝑢
2
)
def
=
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨
(𝑥
−1
𝑖
(𝑢
1
) × 𝑥
−1
𝑖
(𝑢
2
)) ∩ 𝐸
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨
|𝐸|
. (2)
The set 𝐸 also implicitly defines a univariate degree distribu-
tion 𝜒 : Z × Z → R where for integers 𝑎 < 𝑏 we take
𝜒 (𝑎, 𝑏)
def
=
|{V ∈ 𝑉 | 𝑎 ⩽ 𝑑 (V) < 𝑏}|
|𝑉|
, (3)
and a bivariate degree distribution 𝜒 : (Z × Z)2 → R where
for every 4-tuple of integers 𝑎 < 𝑏, 𝑎󸀠 < 𝑏󸀠 we take
𝜒 (𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑎
󸀠
, 𝑏
󸀠
)
def
=
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨
{𝑒 ∈ 𝐸 | 𝑒 = (𝑢, V) ; 𝑎 ⩽ 𝑑 (𝑢) < 𝑏; 𝑎󸀠 ⩽ 𝑑 (V) < 𝑏󸀠}
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨
|𝐸|
.
(4)
Finally, we compute pathogen prevalence 𝑝 ∈ [0, 1] as
𝑝
def
=
|𝐴|
|𝑉|
. (5)
The statistical network model M(D) derived from risk net-
workD is taken to be the (2𝑚 + 3)-tuple:
M (D)
def
= ({𝛼
𝑖
}
𝑖=1,...,𝑚
, {𝛽
𝑖
}
𝑖=1,...,𝑚
, 𝜒, 𝜒, 𝑝) . (6)
In the next section, we present the statistical network
model extracted from the SFHR risk network.
(C) Specifying Model Parameters Based on Real-World Risk
Network Data. In the context of this work, by applying
ERGM analysis to the risk network D obtained from the
SFHR survey data, we determined that 𝑚 = 4 individual
attributes exerted significant influence on the likelihood of
edge formation. The names and categorical ranges of each of
these significant attributes𝑋 = {𝑥
1
, . . . , 𝑥
4
} are provided (see
Table 1), as well as the univariate and bivariate distributions
Table 1: Significant Attributes (as determined by ERGM).
Name Possible values (𝑈
𝑖
)
𝑥
1
: Gender {Male, Female}
𝑥
2
: Ethnicity {White, Hispanic,African-American, Other}
𝑥
3
: AgeBinned
{[15–20), [20–25), [25–30),
[30–35), [35–40), [40–45),
[45–50), [50–55)}
𝑥
4
: DegreeBinned {[0–2), [2–4), [4–10),[10–20)}
Table 2: Gender univariate 𝛼
1
.
Male Female
𝛼
1
541/767 226/767
of Gender (see Tables 2 and 6), Ethnicity (see Tables 3 and 7),
AgeBinned (see Tables 4 and 8), and DegreeBinned (see
Tables 5 and 9). A full exposition of their derivation by ERGM
analysis is available [23]. Finally, as 39% of individuals in
the SFHR risk network were HIV+; in the corresponding
statistical network model, we take 𝑝 = 0.39.
(D) Generating New Artificial Risk Networks Using the
Parametrized Model. Given a statistical network model M,
procedure MakeNetwork (Listing 1) instantiates a new net-
work of arbitrary size 𝑛 usingM as a statistical guideline. In
the first phase (line 1 of Listing 1), the MakePopulation
procedure is called (Listing 2), which, in turn, creates 𝑛
individuals, assigning each of their 𝑚 properties indepen-
dently at random, using the univariate attribute distributions
𝛼
1
, . . . , 𝛼
𝑚
(lines 4, 5). Then, the degree distribution 𝜒 (line
7) is used to assign each individual an ideal degree 𝑑(V).
Justification for individuals having an intrinsic ideal degree
comes from prior work on drug scene “roles” [9, 24]. In the
second phase (line 2 of Listing 1), the MakePathogens pro-
cedure is called (Listing 3), which in turn distributes the
pathogen to each of the individuals in𝑉 (line 2), in a manner
that reflects the specified prevalence level 𝑝 (lines 3, 4). In the
third phase (line 3 of Listing 1), the MakeRelations procedure
is called (Listing 4) to create the risk relationships between
individuals. To do this, it initializes the neighbors of each
node V
𝑖
(line 2) to be the empty set (line 3) and then schedules
𝑑(V
𝑖
) executions of the AddEdge procedure for each node
V
𝑖
(lines 4-5). Because each node V
𝑖
(𝑖 = 1, . . . , |𝑉|) adds
each of its 𝑒 = 1, . . . , 𝑑(V
𝑖
) edges by calling AddEdge at time
1/(𝑒𝑖 + 1), all edges have been added by time 1/2, allowing
MakeRelations to aggregate the set of all edges at time
1 (lines 6–8 of Listing 4).While onemight prefer to spread the
AddEdge events needed to construct the network topology
uniformly at random within the time interval (0, 1), in
practice, such an approach has high space complexity since
it requires the discrete event simulator’s event queue to hold
|𝐸| AddEdge events. In contrast, the deterministic 1/(𝑒𝑖 + 1)
scheduling scheme allows the depth of the event queue to be
bounded by𝑂(|𝑉|), since each node V
𝑖
needs to only have one
AddEdge event pending at any given time (upon which V
𝑖
can
schedule another AddEdge event if necessary, to generate its
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Table 3: Ethnicity univariate 𝛼
2
.
White Hispanic African-American Other
𝛼
2
243/767 206/767 311/767 7/767
Table 4: AgeBinned univariate 𝛼
3
.
[15–20) [20–25) [25–30) [30–35) [35–40) [40–45) [45–50) [50–55)
𝛼
3
6/767 32/767 158/767 172/767 198/767 159/767 23/767 19/767
Table 5: DegreeBinned univariate 𝜒.
[0–2) [2–4) [4–10) [10–20)
𝜒 322/767 221/767 161/767 63/767
Input: statistical network model ({𝛼
𝑖
}
𝑖=1,...,𝑚
,
{𝛽
𝑖
}
𝑖=1,...,𝑚
, 𝜒, 𝜒, 𝑝); and desired population size 𝑛.
Output: risk network (𝑥
𝑖
, 𝑉, 𝐸, 𝐴, 𝑑)
𝑖=1,...,𝑚
.
(1) ({𝑥
𝑖
} , 𝑑, 𝑉) ←MakePopulation (𝑛, {𝛼
𝑖
} , 𝜒)
(2) 𝐴 ←MakePathogens (𝑉, 𝑝)
(3)𝐸 ←MakeRelations ({𝛽
𝑖
} , 𝜒, {𝑥
𝑖
} , 𝑑, 𝑉)
𝑖=1,...,𝑚
(4) return (𝑥
𝑖
, 𝑉, 𝐸, 𝐴, 𝑑)
𝑖=1,...,𝑚
.
Listing 1: Procedure MakeNetwork.
next incident edge). The deterministic scheme thus provides
an approximation to the ideal uniform random distribution
of AddEdge events, ensuring that all nodes make concurrent
progress towards fulfilling their ideal degree within the time
interval (0, 1) while at the same time avoiding high space
complexity in the software implementation—a necessary
consideration for network simulations at the scales we intend.
Each execution of AddEdge takes place in the context of a
specific vertex V, at a specific time 𝑡 (Listing 5). Hereafter, all
time-varying sets and functions (e.g., V,N) shall be so desig-
nated by providing the temporal coordinate 𝑡 as superscript
(i.e., as 𝑉𝑡, 𝑁𝑡). Procedure AddEdge determines the set of
new neighbor candidates (line 2), consisting of vertices which
are not already neighbors of V. If candidates exist (line 3),
the procedure computes the edge deficit for each candidate
𝑐 (line 5) as the difference between 𝑐’s ideal degree 𝑑(𝑐) and
actual degree |𝑁𝑡(𝑐)|, rescaling this into [0, 1] by compos-
ing with the smooth function 𝑒−1/𝑥 that approaches 1 as
𝑥 → ∞ and 0 as 𝑥 → 0+. The quantity 𝑎
𝛿
(𝑐) is thus near
1 whenever |𝑁𝑡(𝑐)| ≪ 𝑑(𝑐) and becomes 0 when 𝑐’s actual
degree |𝑁𝑡(𝑐)| attains its ideal value 𝑑(𝑐). The selection of
candidate 𝑐 is also influenced by the actual degrees of V and 𝑐
(line 6), reflecting the bivariate degree distribution𝜒 (suitably
binned to 2𝜀-sized buckets). Likewise, the joint attributes of
V and 𝑐 influence the candidate selection (line 7), reflecting
the bivariate attribute distributions 𝛽
𝑖
. These three factors are
aggregated as 𝑐’s propensity 𝜔(𝑐) (line 8), which is then nor-
malized across 𝐶 to define a probability distribution 𝑞 (line
9). Finally, a candidate 𝑤 is selected from 𝐶 (line 10) via the
Input: pop. size 𝑛, attribute distributions {𝛼
𝑖
}
𝑖=1,...,𝑚
,
degree distribution 𝜒.
Output: ({𝑥
𝑖
} , 𝑑, 𝑉)
𝑖=1,...,𝑚
.
(1) 𝑉 = {V
1
, V
2
, . . . , V
𝑛
}.
(2) foreach V
𝑘
in 𝑉 do
(3) //Set the properties of individual V
𝑘
.
(4) foreach 𝑖 in 1, . . . , 𝑚 do
(5) 𝑥
𝑖
(V
𝑘
) := an element of𝑈
𝑖
randomly selected
via𝛼
𝑖
.
(6) //Set individual V
𝑘
’s ideal ego net size
(7) 𝑑(V
𝑘
) := an integer randomly chosen distribution 𝜒.
(8) return ({𝑥
𝑖
} , 𝑑, 𝑉)
𝑖=1,...,𝑚
.
Listing 2: Procedure MakePopulation.
Input: population 𝑉, pathogen prevalence 𝑝
Output:𝐴
(1) 𝐴 = 0
(2) foreach V
𝑖
in 𝑉 do
(3) if𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 (0, 1) < 𝑝 than
(4) 𝐴 := 𝐴 ∪ {V
𝑖
}
(5) return𝐴
Listing 3: Procedure MakePathogens.
probability distribution 𝑞 just defined, and the edge (V, 𝑤) is
added (line 12) by augmenting the neighbor set of V.
To understand the three biases used in defining 𝜔(𝑐),
we remark that taking 𝜔(𝑐) = 𝑎𝑡
𝜒
(𝑐) would have made
the probability of (V, 𝑐) being selected proportional to the
bivariate degree distribution𝜒 evaluated in the neighborhood
of V and 𝑐’s actual degrees. Using 𝑎𝑡
𝜒
(𝑐) as a factor within
the definition of 𝜔(𝑐) thus ensures that a pair of vertices
(V, 𝑐) that is exceptional with respect to 𝜒 will be corre-
spondingly improbable as a candidate for the addition of an
edge. Likewise, taking 𝜔(𝑐) = 𝑎𝑡
𝛽
(𝑐) would have made the
probability of (V, 𝑐) being selected proportional to the product
of the 𝑚 bivariate attribute distributions 𝛽
𝑖
evaluated at V
and 𝑐. Using 𝑎𝑡
𝛽
(𝑐) as a factor within the definition of 𝜔(𝑐)
thus has the effect that a pair of vertices (V, 𝑐) which are
exceptional with respect to any 𝛽
𝑖
will be also be improbable
as a candidate pair for the addition of an edge. Finally, the
bias 𝑎
𝛿
(𝑐) favors the selection of candidates who still have
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Input: bivariate attribute distributions{𝛽
𝑖
}
𝑖=1,...,𝑚
,
bivariate degree distributions 𝜒, individual
attributes {𝑥
𝑖
}
𝑖=1,...,𝑚
and ideal degree 𝑑,
the population 𝑉
Output:𝐸
(1) 𝐸 = 0.
(2) foreach 𝑖 in 1, . . . , |𝑉| do
(3) 𝑁(V
𝑖
) := 0.
(4) foreach 𝑒 = 1, . . . , 𝑑 (V
𝑖
) do
(5) Schedule AddEdge(V
𝑖
) to take place at
time 1/(𝑒𝑖 + 1) .
(6) Wait until time 1.
(7) 𝐸 := ⋃|𝑉|
𝑖=1
⋃
𝑤∈𝑁(V𝑖)
{(V, 𝑤)}
(8) return𝐸
Listing 4: Procedure MakeRelations.
Table 6: Gender bivariate 𝛽
1
.
𝛽
1
Male Female
Male 556/1032 180/1032
Female 180/1032 116/1032
a large residual degree (i.e., deficit from ideal degree). Over
the course of the network building process, this bias has
the effect of ensuring that all nodes in the network have
residual degrees of comparable magnitude. By ensuring that
all nodesmaintain comparable residual degrees, weminimize
the chances that the network building process will “get stuck”
(i.e., reach a state in which the subset of nodes having positive
residual degree already form a clique in the network built so
far). While it is true that these three biases 𝑎
𝛿
(𝑐), 𝑎
𝑡
𝜒
(𝑐), and
𝑎
𝑡
𝛽
(𝑐) could have been aggregated to form 𝜔(𝑐) in a variety of
ways, we chose to use their product in order to ensure that
a candidate that is very improbable with respect to any one
(or more) of the constituent factors will be rendered unlikely
to be selected.More sophisticated definitions of𝜔 (e.g., where
the constituent factors 𝑎
𝛿
(𝑐), 𝑎
𝑡
𝜒
(𝑐), and 𝑎𝑡
𝛽
(𝑐) are each expo-
nentiated by different constants to allow for differences in
their relative influence) were considered, but the experimen-
tal outcomes we report on here were found to be robust to a
wide range of exponent values, and so the simple product
formulation was deemed adequate for this exposition.
2.2. Network DynamismModel. Individual agency may drive
PWIDs to leave the risk network over time. To model this,
each node V is assigned a network lifetime 𝐿(V) when it first
enters the network, chosen by sampling from a positive
truncated Gaussian [25] of mean 𝜇𝑠𝑡 and standard deviation
𝜎
𝑠𝑡. In the context of this work, a dearth of hard diachronic
data forced us to choose𝜇𝑠𝑡 and𝜎𝑠𝑡 based on the ethnographic
reports of researchers in the SFHR study. We took 𝜇𝑠𝑡 = 60,
𝜎
𝑠𝑡
= 48months, reflecting reports that PWIDs in the SFHR
network remained participants for a period ranging between
2 and 8 years.
Whenever the network lifetime 𝐿(V) of node V expires,
it breaks its risk relationships and removes itself from the
network. The proposed network dynamismmodel assumes a
constant population size |𝑉𝑡| = |𝑉1| (for 𝑡 > 1); so the
departing individual V is immediately replaced with a new
individual V󸀠. The attributes 𝑥
𝑖
(V󸀠) are determined by 𝛼
𝑖
and
the ideal degree𝑑(V󸀠) by𝜒, inmuch the samemanner as when
the initial populationwas sampled (see lines 4–6 of Listing 2).
The new individual V󸀠 connects to 𝑑(V󸀠) existing nodes
in the network by repeatedly calling a modified version of
AddEdge inwhich the bias due to degree constraints has been
modified (compare with line 5 of Listing 2) as follows:
𝑎
𝛿
(𝑐) :=
((
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨𝑁
𝑡
(𝑐)
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨 + 1) / (𝑑 (𝑐) + 1))
𝑤
𝑆
((|𝑁𝑡 (𝑐)| + 1) / (𝑑 (𝑐) + 1))
𝑤
𝑆
+ 1
. (7)
Note that 𝑎
𝛿
(𝑐) = 1/2 whenever |𝑁𝑡(𝑐)| = 𝑑(𝑐), and that
𝑑 (𝑐)
|𝑁𝑡 (𝑐)|
󳨀→ ∞ 󳨐⇒ 𝑎
𝛿
(𝑐) 󳨀→ 1,
𝑑 (𝑐)
|𝑁𝑡 (𝑐)|
󳨀→ 0
+
󳨐⇒ 𝑎
𝛿
(𝑐) 󳨀→ 0.
(8)
The parameter𝑤𝑆 controls the rate at which 𝑎
𝛿
(𝑐) approaches
the limits asserted above and so determines how closely
individual nodes adhere to their ideal degree over the course
of their network lifetimes. Justification for an individual
having an intrinsic ideal degree comes from prior work on
network “roles” and the correlations between role and ego
network size [9, 24]. In the context of this work, we took
𝑤
𝑆
= 2.9, thereby ensuring that when actual degree was more
than 30% above ideal degree 𝑎
𝛿
(𝑐) ≈ 0 (and analogously,
when actual degree was more than 30% below ideal degree,
𝑎
𝛿
(𝑐) ≈ 1).
2.3. Infection Model. Each individual V in the network has
an intrinsic tendency to engage in risk acts 𝑡𝑅(V), which is
assumed to be time-invariant and drawn at the outset from
the positive reals using a truncated Gaussian [25] with mean
𝜇
𝑅 and standard deviation 𝜎𝑅. In the course of simulations, a
risk event stream is generated at each individual V as a Poisson
processwherein the time between successive impulses follows
an exponential distribution having rate |𝑁𝑡(V)|/𝑡𝑅(V). Upon
experiencing a risk event at time 𝑡, node V selects a partner
𝑤 uniformly at random from among its neighbors𝑁𝑡(V) and
engages in a mutual risk act with 𝑤.
In the context of this work, 𝜇𝑅 and 𝜎𝑅 were set in
accordance with the SFHR data set. Given that the criterion
for a “link” in the SFHR survey was “participation in amutual
risk act in the last 30 days” [26, page 115], the parameter
𝜇
𝑅
was set to 1.0 months, so that nodes would draw from a
distribution of risk profiles centered at 1 risk event per month
per risk partner. Given that the mean degree of nodes in the
SFHR network was 3.4, the actors in our model would, on
average, engage in 3-4 risk events per 30-day period. This
alignswell with the 30-day risk event rate analyses in the study
report [26, page 136-7]. SFHR interview subjects reported an
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Input: individual V.
(1) //Determine candidate new neighbors for v.
(2) 𝐶𝑡 (V) := 𝑉𝑡 \ (𝑁𝑡 (V) ∪ {V}).
(3) if 󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨𝐶
𝑡
(V)
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨 > 0 then
(4) foreach 𝑐 in 𝐶𝑡 (V) do
(5) Compute the bias due to degree constraints:
𝑎
𝛿
(𝑐) := {
𝑒
−1/(𝑑(𝑐)−|𝑁(𝑐)|)
|𝑁(𝑐)| < 𝑑(𝑐)
0 otherwise.
(7)
(6) Compute the bias due to the bivariate degree distribution:
𝑎
𝑡
𝜒
(V, 𝑐) := 𝜒 (
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨𝑁
𝑡
(V)
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨 − 𝜀,
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨𝑁
𝑡
(V)
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨 + 𝜀,
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨𝑁
𝑡
(𝑐)
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨 − 𝜀,
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨𝑁
𝑡
(𝑐)
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨 + 𝜀) . (8)
(7) Compute the bias due to bivariate attribute distributions:
𝑎
𝑡
𝛽
(𝑐) :=
𝑚
∏
𝑖=1
𝛽
𝑖
(𝑥
𝑖
(V) , 𝑥
𝑖
(𝑐)) . (9)
(8) Compute propensity of edge (V, 𝑐) as the product of the above three biases:
𝜔
𝑡
(𝑐) := 𝑎
𝛿
(𝑐) ⋅ 𝑎
𝑡
𝜒
(𝑐) ⋅ 𝑎
𝑡
𝛽
(𝑐) . (10)
(9) Normalize propensity to obtain a distribution over 𝐶𝑡(V):
𝑞
𝑡
(𝑐) :=
𝜔
𝑡
(𝑐)
∑
𝑐
󸀠
∈𝐶
𝑡
(V) 𝜔
𝑡 (𝑐󸀠)
. (11)
(10)𝑤 := choose from 𝐶𝑡 (V) randomly according to distribution 𝑞𝑡.
(11) //Add the edge connecting V to 𝑤.
(12) 𝑁𝑡(V) := 𝑁𝑡(V) ∪ {(V, 𝑤)}
Listing 5: Procedure AddEdge.
Table 7: Ethnicity bivariate 𝛽
2
.
𝛽
2
White Hispanic African-American Other
White 232/1032 27/1032 73/1032 4/1032
Hispanic 27/1032 222/1032 57/1032 7/1032
African-Am. 73/1032 57/1032 238/1032 21032
Other 4/1032 7/1032 2/1032 0/1032
Table 8: AgeBinned bivariate 𝛽
3
.
𝛽
3
[15–20) [20–25) [25–30) [30–35) [35–40) [40–45) [45–50) [50–55)
[15–20) 2/1032 1/1032 3/1032 0/1032 0/1032 0/1032 0/1032 0/1032
[20–25) 1/1032 2/1032 12/1032 8/1032 8/1032 5/1032 1/1032 0/1032
[25–30) 3/1032 12/1032 54/1032 63/1032 48/1032 21/1032 3/1032 0/1032
[30–35) 0/1032 8/1032 63/1032 76/1032 71/1032 37/1032 7/1032 2/1032
[35–40) 0/1032 8/1032 48/1032 71/1032 88/1032 55/1032 10/1032 8/1032
[40–45) 0/1032 5/1032 21/1032 37/1032 55/1032 56/1032 4/1032 8/1032
[45–50) 0/1032 1/1032 3/1032 7/1032 10/1032 4/1032 2/1032 0/1032
[50–55) 0/1032 0/1032 0/1032 2/1032 8/1032 8/1032 0/1032 2/1032
Table 9: DegreeBinned bivariate 𝜒.
𝜒 [0–2) [2–4) [4–10) [10–20)
[0–2) 134/1032 74/1032 41/1032 20/1032
[2–4) 74/1032 180/1032 96/1032 49/1032
[4–10) 41/1032 96/1032 60/1032 32/1032
[10–20) 20/1032 49/1032 32/1032 34/1032
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average of 112 monthly injections with a standard deviation
of 139 [26, page 120]. Taking these numbers as our guide, we
set the standard deviation for the risk distribution 𝜎
𝑅
to be
equal to the mean 𝜇
𝑅
. This produced a distribution for 𝑡𝑅
that was near-uniform between 0 and 2, with a long but
rapidly diminishing tail for rates greater than 2 risk events
per number of risk partners per month.
During each risk act, the likelihood of viral transmission
is 0 if both individuals have the same infection status. If the
individuals are serodiscordant (i.e., precisely one of them is
infected), then the probability of transmission is modeled by
an infectiousness curve 𝐼+ which maps the age of the infection
(amount of time that has elapsed since the positive individual
in the pair first became infected) to the probability of
the pathogen’s transmission. In the case of HIV, the infec-
tiousness curve decreases sharply at approximately three
months and remains at very low levels until over eight years
later [27–29]. Given that HIV infectiousness drops sharply
approximately 3 months after the time of initial infection,
we model 𝐼+ as a two-parameter step function (see Figure 1)
whose value is 𝑝𝐻 for the 3-month acute phase and 𝑐𝐿/𝐻 ⋅ 𝑝𝐻
in the subsequent chronic phase (𝑐𝐿/𝐻 ≪ 1).
In the context of this work, 𝑝𝐻 and 𝑐𝐿/𝐻 were set in
accordance with prior knowledge concerning HIV. While
no precise data was available on per-risk-event infection
probability for HIV, Hagan and colleagues found that HCV
risk among PWID showed a 3- to 5-fold increase in sero-
conversion rates and a risk factor of 5.9 for those who
shared drug preparation equipment or syringes [30]. Initially,
𝑝
𝐻 was to be a tuning parameter such that once all other
parameters had been set according to the SFHR data, a
series of trials could be undertaken in simulated networks
and 𝑝𝐻 set to yield HIV prevalence stabilization levels that
matched those observed historically in the SFHR network
(i.e., 40%–50%). This proved unnecessarily sophisticated, as
variations in the per-risk-event infection probability (from
as low as 2% to as high as 10%) showed little effect on HIV
prevalence stabilization levels. In the end, we chose a per-
risk-event infection probability 𝑝𝐻 = 5%. The value of 𝑐𝐿/𝐻
was taken to be 1/100, a representative value in the range of
published estimates (between 1/20 and 1/1000) for relative
HIV infectiousness in the chronic versus acute phase [28, 31].
3. Measuring Firewalling Effects
At a time 𝑡, two types of network obstructions curtail the
continued growth of the set of HIV+ individuals 𝐴𝑡 ⊆ 𝑉𝑡 in
a risk network 𝐺𝑡 = (𝑉𝑡, 𝐸𝑡):
(i) Type 1. The risk network 𝐺𝑡 may not be a connected
graph. Since the virus propagates over risk relation-
ships, the multiplicity of components may act as a
network obstruction to viral propagation.
(ii) Type 2. An HIV− individual whose viral burden is
in the chronic low-infectiousness phase cannot be
reinfected through new risk behaviors, and so cannot
return to a state of acute infectiousness. When such
an individual separatesHIV−nodes from acuteHIV+
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Figure 1: A two-parameter representation of HIV infectiousness as
a function of infection age.
individuals, it obstructs the transmission of the virus
from the latter to the former.
In this section, we formally define a graph-theoretic measure
which captures the extent to which HIV− individuals can
attribute their uninfected status to the two types of network
obstructions described above.
Towards this, let 𝐺𝑡 be the graph obtained by deleting
from 𝐺𝑡 all infected individuals in the chronic phase along
with all their incident edges. The individuals in the chronic
phase are precise:
𝑂
𝑡
def
= {V | 𝐼
+
(V) ⩽ 𝑐
𝐿/𝐻
⋅ 𝑝
𝐻
} ⊆ 𝐴
𝑡
, (9)
and since the virus cannot re-infect individuals in 𝑂𝑡, the
graph 𝐺𝑡 may be thought of as the virus’s view of the
network 𝐺𝑡. While the graph 𝐺𝑡 need not be connected,
it may be (uniquely) decomposed into maximal connected
components:
𝐺
𝑡
= Γ
𝑡
1
⊔ Γ
𝑡
2
⊔ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⊔ Γ
𝑡
ℓ
𝑡 . (10)
We introduce an indexing function 𝑖𝑡 : 𝑉𝑡 \ 𝑂𝑡 → {1, . . . , ℓ𝑡}
to identify the component inwhich each individual V in𝑉𝑡\𝑂𝑡
may be found; that is, 𝑖𝑡(V) = 𝑗 ⇔ V ∈ Γ𝑡
𝑗
. We are interested in
the situation where anHIV− individual V lies in a component
of 𝐺𝑡 that contains one of the known acute HIV infections:
𝐻
𝑡
def
= {V | 𝐼
+
(V) ⩾ 𝑝
𝐻
} ⊆ 𝐴
𝑡
, (11)
since this implies that V may potentially acquire the virus
through a sequence of one or more transmissions. Accord-
ingly, we define a Boolean-valued function 𝜙𝑡 : 𝑉𝑡 \ 𝐴𝑡 →
{0, 1} by putting
𝜙
𝑡
(V)
def
= {
1 Γ
𝑡
𝑖
𝑡
(V) ∩ 𝐻
𝑡
= 0,
0 otherwise.
(12)
Now, 𝜙𝑡(V) = 1 if and only if V is in a component of𝐺𝑡 with no
acute infections. Pulling back from the virus’ viewpoint 𝐺𝑡 to
the human perspective𝐺𝑡, we see that 𝜙𝑡(V) = 1 if either (1) V
is in a component of 𝐺𝑡 with no acute infections or (2) V is in
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a component of 𝐺𝑡 containing acute infections but all paths
from V to acute HIV+ individuals are blocked by interceding
chronic HIV+ individuals. It follows that 𝜙𝑡(V) = 1 precisely
when anHIV− individual V is enjoying one of the two types of
network obstructions presented at the outset of this section.
We now introduce the quantitative measure:
FW (𝑡) def=
∑V∈𝑉𝑡\𝐴𝑡 𝜙
𝑡
(V)
|𝑉𝑡 \ 𝐴𝑡|
. (13)
When FW(𝑡) ≈ 1, almost all HIV− individuals are experienc-
ing one of the two types of network obstructions described
above; when FW(𝑡) ≈ 0, the two types of network obstruc-
tions cannot be said to significantly account for the HIV−
status of the uninfected individuals.
3.1. An Example. The top image in Figure 2 shows a 26-node
risk network with three connected components consisting
of 2, 3, and 21 individuals. The bottom image shows the
corresponding 6-component risk network obtained once
individuals with chronic-phase infections (blue nodes) and
their incident edges have been deleted. In effect, the top
figure is a human-centric rendering of the risk network, while
the combinatorial object at the bottom is a virus-centric
rendering of the same risk network. At each instant in
time, the virus-centric rendering of risk network may be
decomposed into a collection of connected components. The
fates of individuals in each connected component therein
are seemingly intertwined by sequences of risk relationships,
while individuals lying in different components have more
independent destinies with respect to infection outcomes
(assuming the instantaneous network structure). Each con-
nected component can be assigned a risk status, wherein it
is deemed to be at risk (resp., firewalled) if acute infections
(red nodes) are present (resp., absent) from it. In the virus-
centric rendering of the risk network shown at the bottom
of Figure 2, there are 4 components at risk and 2 which
are firewalled. In this analysis, the uninfected individuals
within each component in the virus-centric view inherit
the risk status of the component in which they lie. Since
the 4 components that are at risk have 4, 2, 3, and 1
uninfected individuals in them respectively, the total number
of individuals said to be at risk is 4 + 2 + 3 + 1 = 10. On
the other hand, since the 2 components that are firewalled
both have 3 uninfected individuals in them, the total number
of individuals said to be firewalled is 3 + 3 = 6. From this,
we conclude that out of the total 10 + 6 = 16 uninfected
individuals, a 6/16 = 0.375 fraction may attribute their
present good fortune to the fact that the virus cannot reach
them because of the network partitioning induced by old
infections and/or link sparsity. In the example, the value of
the FWmeasure is 0.375, which is a relatively low valuewithin
the range 0 to 1 of possible values.
Now consider the human-centric view of a topologically
isomorphic risk network shown at the top of Figure 3,
having precisely the same pathogen prevalence, and the same
number of acute and chronic infections as the previous
network considered in Figure 2. Since the chronic infections
Human-centric view
Virus-centric view
Chronic (low infectiousness)
Acute (high infectiousness)
Negative
1
2
3
1
2
3
Figure 2: (Top) Risk network with 10 HIV+ (4 acute) out of 26
nodes; (bottom) virus-centric view, FW: 6/16 = 0.375.
Human-centric view
1
2
3
Virus-centric view
1
2
3
Chronic (low infectiousness)
Acute (high infectiousness)
Negative
Figure 3: (Top) Risk network with 10 HIV+ (4 acute) out of 26
nodes; (bottom) virus-centric view, FW: 15/16 = 0.9375.
are situated identically in the two networks, the virus-
centric views are isomorphic (as graphs). What is different
between the two networks, however, is the placement of
acute infections (relative to the constant locations of chronic
infections).The virus-centric view of the network in Figure 3
has 2 at-risk components and 4 firewalled components. Of
the 16 uninfected individuals, the number that is at risk is 1,
while the number that is firewalled is 15.Thus, the value of the
FW measure is 15/16 = 0.938, a relatively high value within
the range 0 to 1 of possible values. What these two examples
illustrate is that the FW measure is defined in terms of the
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local network structure relevant to the virus propagation
dynamics and depends heavily on the relative placement of
acute and chronic infections within the risk network.
4. Simulation Experiments
In this section, we use the SFHR-based statistical network
model (with a modified pathogen prevalence parameter 𝑝 =
0.001) to sample artificial risk networks of 1000–25,000 nodes
containing 0.1% HIV+ individuals. These artificial networks
serve as initial states of a stochastic discrete dynamical system
whose evolution is governed by the dynamism and infection
models of Sections 2.2 and 2.3.We simulatedmultiple 15-year
trajectories of the system and computed the HIV prevalence
rates along these trajectories as functions of time. Figure 4
shows that HIV prevalence stabilized at approximately 40%
in all but the 1000-node network. Each graph shows the
results obtained across 10 simulation trials, with vertical bars
indicating the standard deviations. To give the reader a sense
of scale, in a 25,000 node network, each trial entailed that
approximately 15.5 million risk events across which HIV
infection could have taken place.
To test the firewall hypothesis, the system was frozen in
mid-trajectory at monthly time intervals so the value of the
FWmeasure could be computed (as defined in (13)). Figure 5
depicts the value of FW(𝑡), plotted as a function of time
𝑡 for 15-year trajectories corresponding to the same set of
trials shown in Figure 4. We see that the FW measure rises
rapidly from 0 to 0.8 during the first 18 months, rebounding
briefly to 0.75 in the next 5 years, and then restabilizing
again back at the 0.8 level. Despite the fact that the 1000-
node network showed high variation in the HIV prevalence
between different trials, and a much more gradual rise in
overall rates, here too the firewall hypothesis seems to hold
true, though there are greater variations across trials. While
the graphs show that 70–80% of HIV− individuals were
firewalled, this does not imply that new, acute (and thus
highly infectious) HIV infections did not occur. Rather, as
seen in Figure 6, acute infections continued to appear in
the network at a relatively steady rate even after the initial
hot spike, though clearly they failed to propagate across the
network.
5. The Emergence and Maintenance
of Firewalls
To facilitate further analysis, we divided the trajectories,
referring to the first 18 months as the emergent period, and
the 13+ later years as the steady period. Each of the periods is
treated in turn in the sections that follow.
5.1. Emergent Period. To understand the behavior of the FW
measure along system trajectories, we return to its definition
as the quotient of the number of firewalled individuals by
the number of HIV− individuals. The number of firewalled
individuals in a risk network of 25,000 nodes is depicted over
the 18-month emergent period in the left graph in Figure 7.
We can see from the graph that at the outset, approximately
Population 1000
Population 5000
Population 25000
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180
Time (months)
H
IV
 p
re
va
le
nc
e r
at
e
Figure 4: HIV rates in PWID networks of size 1 k–25 k nodes.
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Figure 5: Firewall Hypothesis Validity in PWID networks of size
1 k–25 k nodes.
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Figure 6: Number of acute HIV infections in PWID networks of
size 1 k–25 k nodes.
25% of all individuals are firewalled, but that this number
doubles and plateaus over the 18-month duration of the
emergent period. A closer examination reveals that the initial
value of the FW measure is attributable to Type 1 network
obstructions, while its subsequent rise (to be considered in
detail) is due to the emergence of Type 2 obstructions. The
number of HIV− individuals, on the other hand, can be read-
ily determined from HIV prevalence levels. The right graph
of Figure 7 shows that over 18 months, the number of HIV
negative individuals falls from its initial value of 99.5% of all
individuals, plateauing at a mere 57%, just one year into the
simulation. To obtain a clearer understanding of “why” these
two ingredient quantities behave as they do, we shall make
use of the two graphs in Figure 8 which present an array of
measure (means) derived from 10 simulation trials of 25,000
node networks.
(a) The Number of HIV− Individuals. Figure 8(a) reveals
that the number of acute HIV infections rises exponentially
from close to 0 to around 5,000 over a brief 6-month initial
segment of the emergent period. After that, the number of
acute infections begins to decline. To understand why this
occurs, we observe that the average size of at-risk components
decreases sharply from over 3,000 to nearly 1 by month 7
of the emergent period (see Figure 8(b)). As the average at-
risk component size becomes smaller, each acute infection
can impact very fewHIV− individuals through transmission.
When the ability of acute infections to spread has been miti-
gated in this way, as it clearly has by month 7, acute infections
cease to be able to increase exponentially, and instead begin
to decay in number as they transition from acute to chronic
phase over time. This explanation is confirmed (Figure 8(a))
by the drop in the number of acute infections beginning at
month 7 of the simulation. Note that the number of acute
infections does not drop to 0 because even chronic infections
have a nonzero probability (𝑐𝐿/𝐻⋅𝑝𝐻 > 0) of transmittingHIV
and thereby generating new infections. Thus, we see that the
large numbers of chronic infections act as a reservoir of infec-
tiousness and are responsible for continuing to produce new
infections that fail to propagate fully throughout the network.
This decline in the number of acute infections (beginning
in month 7) explains the corresponding leveling off in the
number ofHIV− individuals (see the right graph in Figure 7).
(b)TheNumber of Firewalled Nodes. We begin by considering
Figure 8(a), noting that three months after the hot spike in
acute HIV infections begins (i.e., as acute infections start to
transition into the chronic phase), the number of components
(in the virus-centric view of the risk network) begins to rise,
causing individuals to be removed from the virus-centric
view and splitting the risk network into many components
in the process. The increase in number of components (from
5,700 to 9,000) takes longer than the increase in the number
acute infections because not every transition of an HIV+
individual from acute to chronic phase induces a partition in
the virus-centric risk network. It is natural to ask whether the
3,300 new components that arise are predominantly fire-
walled or at-risk? To resolve this, we note that the number
of at risk components, shown in the lower left graph, declines
dramatically at this time, ending inmonth 20 at a level of 500.
Even if all 500 of these at-risk components were to be found
among the 3300 new components created over the emergent
phase (and thus none were the result of a low probability
infection from a nonacute HIV+ individuals), this would
still indicate that a majority of the new components created
between month 10 and month 20 would be classified as
firewalled. Sincemany new firewalled components of roughly
constant size are being created (see Figure 8(b)), we expect
the number of firewalled nodes to grow and taper, mirroring
the growth curve of the number of components.
5.2. Steady Period. As in our consideration of the emergent
phase, the graphs discussed here are drawn from 10 trials
of 25,000-node PWID networks drawn from the statistical
network model extracted from the SFHR data set. We now
consider the dynamics of the FW measure’s numerator and
denominator during the steady period, after the hot spike
in new infections has subsided. During the steady period,
the number of firewalled individuals (numerator) is seen to
decline from 12,000 to 10,000 over the 13+ years of the sim-
ulation (see Figure 9(a)). The number of HIV− individuals
(denominator) is seen to slowly decrease from just under
15,000 to just under 12,000 over the same time period (see
Figure 9(b)). To render transparent the mechanisms under-
lying this behavior, we shall make use of the bottom two
auxiliary graphs in Figure 9.
(a) The Number of HIV− Individuals. Figure 9(c) depicts
both the number of acute infections and the average risk
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Figure 9: The firewall effect during the steady period.
component size over time. In our base SFHR model 𝑐𝐿/𝐻 ⋅
𝑝
𝐻
= 0.05 × 0.01 = 5 ⋅ 10
−4, which while being small is still
nonzero, providing a slow burn that continuously produces
new infections but is unable to explode into a hot spike
because the average at-risk component size is small (thanks
to the previously demonstrated structural side effects of the
emergent phase), going from a mean size of nearly 35 nodes
down to a less than 10 over the 160 months of the steady
period. The slow burn proceeds, driving the mean size of at-
risk components lower, which in turn, limits the extent to
which new acute infections can spread.The result is that these
two quantities (number of acute infections and average risk
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component size) equilibrate over the steady period. Given
an understanding of the trajectory of acute infections, we
implicitly arrived at an explanation of the trajectory of the
number of HIV− individuals, since these two quantities are
trivially related (Figure 9(b)): if the number of acute infec-
tions stabilizes to a constant nonzero number, then HIV
prevalence will increase at a rate proportional to this number.
(b) The Number of Firewalled Nodes. We turn our atten-
tion now to the number of firewalled nodes (Figure 9(a)).
Figure 9(d) shows that in the first 5 years of the steady period,
the total number of components (in the virus-centric view of
the risk network) declines from 9,000 components to 7,200,
or roughly 80% of its starting value. This implies that 1,800
components seemingly vanished, and it is natural to ask, as
before, whether these 1,800 components were predominantly
of the firewalled or at-risk classification? The graph shows
us that the number of firewalled components experiences
a commensurate decline—and hence the components being
destroyed in the first 5 years are in fact almost exclusively fire-
walled components. Howmight this happen?The third curve
in the graph shows the average size of firewalled components
over time. We see that this number stays fairly steady in the
neighborhood of 1.4, implying that a significant number of
the firewalled components are islets. It is now apparent what
is occurring: when firewalled islets become infected by the
slow burn of adjacent old infections, firewalled components
disappear from the virus-centric network.
5.3. Robustness Considerations. Having conducted simula-
tion experiments based on the SFHR model and used these
to demonstrate the occurrence of subsaturation stabilization
via the firewall hypothesis, we acknowledge that the model
contains a large number of parameters. While these parame-
ters were set to consensus estimates derived from the ethno-
graphic data collected as part of the SFHR study, it would be
natural to askwhether the parameter settings had a significant
impact on the emergence of subsaturation stabilization and
the firewall phenomena in the above experiments. Significant
model parameters included the following:
(1) from Section 2.1(c), the univariate attribute distribu-
tions 𝛼
1
, 𝛼
3
, and 𝛼
3
, the bivariate attribute distribu-
tions 𝛽
1
, 𝛽
2
, and 𝛽
3
, and the univariate (resp., bivari-
ate) degree distributions 𝜒 (resp., 𝜒) together reflect
statistical properties of the network edges. To evaluate
the impact of these parameters, we repeated the pre-
viously described experiments using a statistical net-
work model derived from Project 90 (P90), another
PWID risk network study. Conducted between 1988
and 1992 in Colorado Springs, P90 was a prospective
study of heterosexual subjects who were defined as
being at “high risk” for STI/HIV infection [32, 33].
Eligible subjects reported at least one of the following
behaviors in the past 12 months: exchanging sex for
money or drugs, sex (paying or nonpaying) with a
prostitute, injection of illicit drugs, or sex with an
injection drug user. Unlike the cross-sectional SFHR,
the P90 study followed its subjects for up to 5 years,
with no requirement for year-to-year continuity; new
subjects were additionally recruited each year. 595
enrolled individuals produced 1091 interviews, which
named 8,164 network contacts overall [32, 34–39].
The P90-based simulations were designed to overlap
in scale with the SFHR-based simulations described
above.We found that the specific topology of the real-
world network from which the statistical network
model is derived plays a minor role (a few percentage
points) in the stabilization level dynamics and the FW
measuresmanifested. In particular, analogous subsat-
uration stabilization and firewall effects are apparent
in simulations based on the model derived from the
P90 study.
(2) From Section 2.2, the parameters 𝜇𝑠𝑡, 𝜎𝑠𝑡 serve to
specify the process by which individuals depart from
and arrive at the network, while 𝑤𝑆 regulates node
adherence to ideal degree. To evaluate the impact of
𝜇
𝑠𝑡
, 𝜎
𝑠𝑡, we simulated networks based on the SFHR
model in which 𝜇𝑠𝑡 (mean duration of in-network
lifetime in months) was artificially set to half (resp.,
double) its estimated value, that is, 30 (resp., 120)
months. In these simulations, we found thatHIV rates
stabilized to subsaturation levels within 5% of those
manifested in the “standard” SFHR experiments. The
firewall effect continued to be manifested, though
the value of the FW measure was approximately 10%
lower (resp., 10% higher) than what was seen in
“standard” SFHR experiments. To evaluate the impact
of 𝑤𝑆, we simulated networks based on the SFHR
model in which 𝑤𝑆 was artificially set to half (resp.,
double) its estimated value, that is, 1.5 (resp., 6). In
these simulations, we found that HIV stabilization
(resp., the firewall effect) continued to be apparent,
with prevalence levels (resp., FW measure) deviating
by less than 5% relative to the values observed in the
“standard” SFHR experiments.
(3) From Section 2.3, the parameters 𝜇𝑅, 𝜎𝑅 serve to
specify the random process determining each indi-
vidual’s risk acts, while 𝑝𝐻, 𝑐𝐿/𝐻 govern the form
of the HIV infectiousness curve 𝐼+. To evaluate the
impact of 𝜇𝑅, 𝜎𝑅, we simulated networks based on
the SFHR model in which 𝜇𝑅 (mean time between
risk impulses in months) was artificially set to half
(resp., double) its estimated value, that is, 0.5 (resp., 2)
months. In these simulations, we found thatHIV rates
stabilized to subsaturation levels approximately 40%
higher (resp., 30% lower) than thosemanifested in the
“standard” SFHRexperiments.Thefirewall effect con-
tinued to be manifested, though the value of the FW
measure was approximately 20% higher (resp., 30%
lower) than in the “standard” SFHR experiments. To
evaluate the impact of 𝑝𝐻, 𝑐𝐿/𝐻 we simulated net-
works based on the SFHR model in which the pa-
rameter 𝑝𝐻 (transmission probability during acute
period) was artificially set to half (resp., double) its
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estimated value, that is, 2.5% (resp., 10%). In these
simulations, we found that HIV rates stabilized to
subsaturation levels approximately 50% lower (resp.,
30% higher) than those manifested in the “standard”
SFHR experiments.The firewall effect continued to be
manifested, though the value of the FWmeasure was
approximately 40% lower (resp., 20% higher) than in
the “standard” SFHR experiments.
In summary, our conclusions concerning the emergence
of subsaturation stabilization and the firewall phenomena
(which were drawn from simulations parameterized by data
from the SFHR study), are in fact robust within a wider range
of model parameter settings, though the extent of the two
phenomena (as evaluated by stabilized HIV prevalence levels
and FWmeasure values) is certainly nominally influenced by
the specific choice of model parameter settings.
6. Conclusions
Having described a stochastic dynamical system modeling a
dynamic PWID risk network, whose simulated trajectories
match the historical HIV dynamics known for PWID net-
works in New York City during the early 1980s, we determine
that nodes with mature HIV+ status tend to divide the
network into clusters of uninfected nodes that remained rel-
atively stable over time. Thus, the FH holds significantly (for
up to 80% of uninfected individuals) and so captures an
important barrier to HIV propagation in PWID risk net-
works. In considering the microlevel mechanics underlying
the emergence of the FH, we find it helpful to examine
the network during two phases of HIV infection: an initial,
emergent phase of rapid spreading and a later period of stable
HIV rates. There is an enduring presence of new infections
that fail to propagate during the stable phase, and this is
because of the structural effects created during the emer-
gent phase when a significant fraction of uninfected nodes
coalesce into small components (in the virus-centric view of
the network). These small clusters represent margins of the
network and are often composed of a few (or even single)
individuals. Small components ensure that the ability for new
infections to spread across the network via such individuals
is near nil, even when new infections occur and individuals
enter into a period of high infectiousness, and even as
members of the network continue to engage in risk events that
can transmit the virus.
Our research also suggests that overall network size plays
a key role in HIV dynamics among injecting drug user net-
works. Consistently, networks of size 5,000 through 25,000
behaved within a narrow (and therefore predictable) range of
overall characteristics. Networks of 1000 nodes or fewer, on
the other hand, showed high variability in their network-wide
behavior. This latter finding bears serious consideration for
those concerned with interventions aimed at influencing the
overall rate of HIV among injecting drug user networks. If
smaller networks show high variability in their dynamics—
leading to the idea that they are more subject to stochastic
events than networks of large size—then understanding
where and how particular interventions will succeed or fail
becomes very difficult. What such variability in outcomes
indicates is that stochastic factors may outweigh node level
dynamics in determining network-wide outcomes through
time in small networks. Put another way, the outcome of
interventions in small-scale networks may not serve as good
indicators of likely outcomes of the same intervention in
other small networks, nor in the same networks at a different
time, nor in large networks. In each case, the effects of
random events may render the otherwise most successful
interventions moot, or the most ill-adapted interventions
successful—this without a change in the underlying set
of network attributes or dynamics. We recognize that this
finding represents a difficult challenge to policies advocating
demonstrated evidence-based interventions (DEBIs) [40].
Regardless of whether the precise findings regarding scale
seen here hold up under further investigation, it is clear
that factors of scale ought to be an important criterion for
evaluating what constitutes “demonstration” in evaluating
intervention success or failure.
Simulation of formal dynamical systems is far from
demonstration of actual disease dynamics, of course. But the
results of this project can point to ways that network wide
phenomena are shaped by local social processes, and thereby
open avenues for future research that may be hidden by
the limits of more standard empirical investigation. We note
that the disease dynamics reflected here may be partly ex-
plained by the social circumstances that produce the SFHR
PWID risk network (onwhich the simulation topologies were
based). Among the most important of these is the central
role that shooting galleries played as venues for drug use at
the time of the SFHR study [6, 14, 24, 41]. These and other
forms of enforced propinquitywere encouraged by significant
changes in drug enforcement regimes in New York at the
time. During the 1991–93 time frame, New York City as a
whole—andBushwick in particular, wheremuch of the SFHR
study was conducted—was undergoing a change in drug
interdiction regimes aimed at closing down “open air”
drug markets and injection locations [42–45]. This strat-
egy involved broad “sweeps” in which outdoor users were
routinely arrested for small amounts of drug possession. As
places serving as outdoor drug use locations were increas-
ingly systematically pursued by law enforcement, outdoor
drug use became increasingly precarious, and indoor, more
discreet drug use locations (shooting galleries) grew in
importance as a result [44].
These circumstances may have, at least initially, helped
promote the firewall effect described here. Under such con-
ditions, new users with few network connections are likely
to find themselves in shooting galleries with shooting gallery
operators who were both of high degree and more likely to
be in a state of mature infection, and thus effective fire-
walls against new infections potentially moving through the
network. Conversely, as police interdiction gradually came
to target shooting galleries (and shooting gallery operators
became targets of police arrest), the disruption of stable
relationships and the removal of critical central nodes
from the network may disrupt this firewall effect, forcing
remaining network members to seek out new sources and
injection partners. This would have the effect of significantly
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reorganizing the network (in the virus-centered view). Police
decisions were obviously weighted by other concerns, but
an important suggestion of the simulation results presented
here is that the public health implications of those decisions
are likely difficult to gauge. Drug interdiction strategies are
seldom seen as increasing risk, and itwould likely seemhighly
counterintuitive that the removal of HIV+ individuals who
have been infected for more than three months and who
play a brokerage role in the network may in fact raise the
level of risk for the remaining risk network—but that is
what is suggested here. Such conclusions are obviously highly
speculative. But they come as the results of models and sim-
ulations whose scale and scope cannot be matched by more
direct empirical research. It remains before us to translate
these suggestions into concrete research strategies capable of
testing and evaluating both these results and their implica-
tions for public policy.
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